Previous Article | Next Article ![]()
Applied and Environmental Microbiology, September 2002, p. 4646-4649, Vol. 68, No. 9
0099-2240/02/$04.00+0 DOI: 10.1128/AEM.68.9.4646-4649.2002
Copyright © 2002, American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.
John L. Harb,5 Patrick J. McGuire,6 W. Emmett Barkley,2 Barry R. Bloom,1,2,
and William R. Jacobs, Jr.1,2*
Department of Microbiology and Immunology,1 Department of PediatricsChildrens Hospital at Montefiore,3 Department of Medicine, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York 10461,4 Office of Scientific Operations, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York 10461,5 Department of Engineering, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York 10461,6 Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Chevy Chase, Maryland2
Received 2 January 2002/ Accepted 10 June 2002
|
|
|---|
|
|
|---|
Aerosol delivery of M. tuberculosis has been used in other studies, and an aerosol study laboratory with the ability to infect mice by use of a Henderson aerosol apparatus (5) has been described previously (6). However, there is no published information on the experimental setup used in these infection procedures or on the design of a modern facility for murine studies that would include vaccination or protection experimentation. Furthermore, aerosol infection procedures are likely to vary depending on the experimental setup, and there is no published information available on how to control variables to deliver a standard dose of M. tuberculosis. Hypervirulent M. tuberculosis strains may occur naturally (14), and it is possible that an added occupational hazard exists when drug-resistant M. tuberculosis strains are used. In some cases, mutagenesis studies may also have the potential to create hypervirulent M. tuberculosis. For these reasons, we calibrated a nose-only aerosol apparatus from the U.S. Army Medical and Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) (similar to that used previously [2]) in a specially designed biohazard level-3 (BSL-3) facility. This was achieved through consultation with the safety committees of USAMRIID, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI), and the Albert Einstein College of Medicine (AECOM). The nose-only apparatus selected minimizes the localization of bacteria outside the respiratory tree, and this apparatus is enclosed within an airtight glove box for a maximum amount of BSL-3 safety.
(The data in this paper are from a thesis submitted by J. Reid Schwebach in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy from the Sue Golding Graduate Division of Medical Sciences, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Yeshiva University, Bronx, N.Y.)
Consultation with the USAMRIID, HHMI, and AECOM safety committees allowed for unanimous approval (all parties having equal say) of the facility construction plans. The facility was designed with concern for airflow and the use of dangerous (aerosolized) M. tuberculosis (Fig. 1). Airflow is routed from the least dangerous to the most dangerous rooms, and the aerosol cabinet was placed in the room with the greatest negative pressure (pressures are approximately -0.0066 in. at 74.6°C in the anteroom, -0.0116 in. at 72.2°C in the change room, -0.142 in. at 71.1°C in the equipment room, -0.0209 in. at 71.9°C in the animal room, and -0.250 in. at 75.2°C in the glove box room). This pressure configuration is monitored remotely by AECOM engineering during the day (adjustments are made with temperature changes) and by an alarm system at all times. The design of the biohazard facility allows for multiple researchers to conduct in vitro experiments in type II biosafety cabinets while work is carried out in another portion (Fig. 1). The routing of airflow should direct any aerosolized M. tuberculosis into the most hazardous room. A shower room (Fig. 1) is available for use after immediate evacuation from the aerosol room (evacuation is necessary should a loss of glove box pressure go beneath -0.25 in.). In the event of a leak, workers are required to shower for 3 min in their full-body Kappler 100% polyolefin Tyvek suits (Fisher Scientific, Springfield, N.J.) and model 3M 9210 N95 particulate respirators (Fisher Scientific). Workers in the AECOM-HHMI BSL-3 facility always wear respirators and full-body Tyvek suits. This apparel is donned and removed in the anteroom.
![]() View larger version (54K): [in a new window] |
FIG. 1. Facility floorplan. The BSL-3 facility contains an anteroom (A), a work area complete with multiple biosafety cabinets (B), an animal room (C), and an aerosol room (D). An autoclave joins the aerosol room with the anteroom (D), and a shower room (E) is available for emergency exit. Dimensions of the facility and appliances are indicated in feet. Airflow is indicated by arrows. The aerosol cabinet is also indicated (F).
|
15) are placed in restraining stanchions (Fig. 2K to M) that securely position the animals for nose-only aerosol exposure. After the vapor leaves the exposure chamber, the air is injected into liquid for collection of residual mycobacteria in an all-glass impinger (AGI) (Fig. 2G) (3). The AGI can be used to collect a sample of the air during the exposure to verify the number of bacteria administered. An extensive, approved, and descriptive protocol for the use of this particular aerosol apparatus has been published previously (12). This entire apparatus is safely contained within an Isogard class III glove box (Baker Company, Sanford, Maine) (Fig. 2F) connected to a Sterilgard II, class II, type A/3B hood (Baker Company) (Fig. 2A) in the adjoining room. Sterilization of the glove box is done with paraformaldehyde gas for 8 h. The paraformaldehyde is then neutralized by use of a KMNO4 filter attached to the glove box. This decontamination is to be conducted every 6 months. Settling plates were used for sampling during some experimentation. Exposure of 7H10 agar (Difco, Detroit, Mich.) plates located on all interior corners of the hood floor, for the entire duration of 1 day of experimentation (including four infections, washes, and animal manipulations), did not yield any CFU. This result indicates that little or no deposition of bacteria occurred on the bottom of the hood during the aerosol procedure.
![]() View larger version (44K): [in a new window] |
FIG. 2. Facility and aerosol apparatus photographs. The aerosol cabinet (F) is joined to a biohazard cabinet in the animal room (A) via a sealed, interconnecting passageway (C) that connects the two cabinets between the two rooms. Glove openings in the glove box are shown as dotted lines (J). Airflow in the rooms is indicated above the doorways (ball is pushed by air movement) (B). The control panel of the aerosol apparatus is shown (I), and the nebulizer is illustrated (H). The animal chamber is shown (E), and an AGI (G) and an animal stanchion containing a mouse (D) are illustrated. Mice (L) are contained in stanchions (K and M) that connect to the animal chamber. The nose of each mouse rests inside an aperture of the stanchion (M), allowing for nose-only aerosol exposure. The airflow direction within the aerosol apparatus is indicated by arrows.
|
![]() View larger version (19K): [in a new window] |
FIG. 3. Delivery of M. smegmatis to mice. Total CFU in the lung versus CFU per milliliter in the nebulizer as a result of the aerosolization procedure is shown. Each value represents the average for three animals. Error bars show the standard deviations of the means.
|
![]() View larger version (17K): [in a new window] |
FIG. 4. Delivery of M. tuberculosis Erdman to mice. Total CFU in the lung versus CFU per milliliter in the nebulizer as a result of the aerosolization procedure is shown. Each value represents the average for three animals. Error bars show the standard deviations of the means.
|
We give special thanks to Robert Hawley and Louise Pitts of HHMI, USAMRIID, the AECOM safety committee, the AECOM department of environmental safety, AECOM engineering, and Emmett Barkley of HHMI for their consultation services in the design, construction, and maintenance of this facility and in its protocol construction.
W.R.J. is supported by HHMI. A.C. is supported by NIH grants AI33142, AI33774, and HL59842. A.G. has been an Aaron Diamond Young Investigator Awardee, and this work was supported in part by a grant from the Aaron Diamond Foundation. This work was also supported in part by NIH grant 1K08AI01691 (A.G.). A.C. is also supported by a Burroughs-Wellcome Fund Scholar Award in Experimental Therapeutics. J.R.S. was supported by an NIH training grant in HIV, AIDS, and Opportunistic Infections (grant 5T32AI07501).
Present address: Laboratory of Infection Biology, The Rockefeller University, New York, NY 10021. ![]()
Present address: Harvard School of Public Health, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02115. ![]()
|
|
|---|
This article has been cited by other articles:
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Copyright © 2009 by the American Society for Microbiology. For an alternate route to Journals.ASM.org, visit: http://intl-journals.asm.org | More Info»